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Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress80
The Supreme Court in 1888 was in crisis. Its structure and responsibilities, created 
a century earlier by the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, were no longer adequate or 
appropriate. The Court was over-
whelmed by its docket, and the jus-
tices’ responsibilities, which included 
circuit riding, were impossible to 
meet. Shaped as it was by a law al-
most as old as the country itself, the 
Supreme Court in 1888—and the 
federal judicial system as a whole—
would be barely recognizable to 
many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 estab-
lished not only the Supreme Court, 
but also the entire federal court 
system. The Act divided the coun-
try initially into thirteen districts, 
which were in turn combined into 
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit 
courts, however, the circuit courts 
created in 1789 had original jurisdic-
tion over certain types of cases and 
provided appellate review of only 
a few cases heard originally in the 
district courts. In addition, the Judi-
ciary Act provided for district court 
judges and Supreme Court justices, 
but no circuit court judges. Instead, 
twice a year, two Supreme Court jus-
tices would visit each district and, 
along with one district court judge, 
would sit as the circuit court. There 
were six Supreme Court justices, so 
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that two could be assigned to each 
circuit. Even after 1793, when sub-
sequent laws provided that only 
one Supreme Court justice at a time 
would sit on a circuit courts, mean-
ing that each justice had to make 
the trip only once a year rather than 
twice, an enormous portion of Su-
preme Court justices’ time, was 
spent riding circuit—at a time when 
travel was slow and difficult. And as 
the country grew, more circuits were 
created.
Not only did Supreme Court jus-
tices ride circuit, but the Supreme 
Court itself had no discretion over 
its docket. Cases were appealed to 
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike 
today. This lack of control turned out 
to be extremely problematic. During 
the first century of its existence, not 
only did the United States become 
geographically larger and more pop-
ulous, but industry grew, the coun-
try’s economy became increasingly 
sophisticated, and new laws and 
sources of litigation abounded, espe-
cially after the Civil War. As a result, 
the Supreme Court’s docket grew 
dramatically. At the beginning of the 
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on 
the docket. The Court simply could 
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurt-
er and James M. Landis described 
the situation: “The Supreme Court 
docket became a record of arrears.” 
Less poetically, it took three years for 
a case to be heard. The situation was 
untenable.
Faced with overwhelming case-
loads, by 1888 the Supreme Court 
had already attempted to adjust its 
standard of review in order to dis-
suade lawyers and litigants from 
appealing fact-intensive cases with 
few implications beyond the partic-
ular parties. In Newell v. Norton and 
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involv-
ing a steamboat collision, for exam-
ple, the Court summarily affirmed 
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding 
that there was “ample testimony to 
support the decision.” The Court ex-
plained that it would not engage in 
a searching review of the lengthy re-
cord, which included more than 100 
depositions:
 
Parties ought not to expect this court 
to revise their decrees merely on a 
doubt raised in our minds as to the 
correctness of their judgment, on 
the credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight of conflicting testimony.
The Court’s reluctance to engage 
in error correction, even at a time when 
it had no formal control of its docket, 
continues to this day. Today, Supreme 
Court Rule 10, Considerations Gov-
erning Review on Writ of Certioari, 
explains that a “petition for a writ of 
certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous 
factual findings or the misapplica-
tion of a properly stated rule of law.”
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Despite the Court’s effort to define a very narrow scope of review, it 
was unable to halt the flood of cases 
coming to it. Facing both its own 
swelling docket and the geographic 
expansion of the country, the jus-
tices found circuit riding to be in-
creasingly difficult and they often 
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter 
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the 
statutory duty of the Justices to at-
tend circuit was practically a dead 
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme 
Court alone that was unable to func-
tion properly. Despite some earlier 
attempts to expand and reform the 
lower courts, there were still not 
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts, 
which were supposed to sit with two 
judges, often had to function with 
only one. Even more problematic, 
that single judge was often a district 
court judge who was hearing appeals 
of his own decisions. In 1889, a pa-
per presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association put 
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip 
drunk to Philip sober, but from 
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated 
with the vanity of a matured opin-
ion and doubtless also a published 
decision.
This arrangement could not possibly 
inspire confidence in an impartial 
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891, 
after many years of considering and 
rejecting proposals for major reform, 
and the federal judicial system we 
know today began to emerge. Most 
significantly, Congress established 
intermediate appellate courts for the 
first time. If litigants were required 
to appeal first to those intermediate 
courts, the hope was, many fewer of 
them would subsequently take their 
cases to the Supreme Court. The law 
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of 
cases, at least at first. During 1890, 
before passage, 623 new cases were 
docketed at the Supreme Court. In 
1892, the number dropped by more 
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts 
Act, also contained the seeds of to-
day’s Court’s largely discretionary 
jurisdiction. For the first time, Con-
gress created a category of cases that 
the Supreme Court would review 
only upon certification, or certiorari, 
although most cases continued to 
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced 
the opportunity to limit the number 
of cases coming before it. During 
the first two years after passage of 
the 1891 act, it granted certiorari 
in only two cases. While careful to 
maintain its power to grant certiora-
ri in any case pending in the courts 
of appeals, the Court was, quite 
deliberately, “chary of action in re-
spect to certiorari,” as it explained 
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, de-
cided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court 
announced narrow criteria for when 
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certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be 
sparingly exercised, and only when 
the circumstances of the case sat-
isfy us that the importance of the 
question involved, the necessity of 
avoiding conflict between two or 
more courts of appeal, or between 
courts of appeal and the courts of a 
state, or some matter affecting the 
interests of this nation in its inter-
nal or external relations, demands 
such exercise.
These criteria remain, largely un-
changed, the stated criteria for cer-
tiorari today as set forth in Supreme 
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was 
not successful in its goal of cutting 
the Court’s workload to a manage-
able size. It did not eliminate most 
of the Court’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction. The hope that the cre-
ation of the intermediate appellate 
courts would satisfy litigants’ need 
for appellate review, thereby making 
an appeal to the Supreme Court less 
attractive, proved largely illusory. 
(Lawyers and litigants often appar-
ently used the right of an appeal to 
the Supreme Court simply as a de-
laying tactic, a possibility that seems 
entirely obvious to a modern legal 
audience.) In the years following the 
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Su-
preme Court’s caseloads increased 
again to unmanageable proportions, 
as the nation, its economy, and its 
judicial business continued to grow. 
Moreover, even after 1891 and de-
spite the concern for the Supreme 
Court’s caseload that inspired the 
Evarts Act, Congress continued to 
create even more categories of man-
“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co., 
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903, 
for example, it passed the Expediting 
Act, which created the three-judge 
district court to hear certain anti-
trust cases. Appeals from this type 
of district court went directly to the 
Supreme Court as of right. And over 
the following 10 to 15 years, Con-
gress provided that more and more 
types of cases follow this procedure. 
(A handful of cases, such as consti-
tutional challenges to congressional 
districts, are subject to this proce-
dure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction in some ar-
eas, Congress did cut back on it in 
others. In 1916, for example, Con-
gress eliminated mandatory juris-
diction over Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act cases, as well as certain 
cases arising out of state courts, cas-
es from the Philippines, and cases 
arising under certain other federal 
statutes. The most significant over-
haul of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion, however, was the 1925 Judges’ 
Bill—so called because it was drafted 
by members of the Supreme Court 
itself. The Act dramatically expand-
ed the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, 
leaving only a few, relatively small 
categories of cases for mandatory 
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like 
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court 
from having to decide cases that were 
not important to anyone beyond 
the immediate parties involved and 
to allow it to focus on more nation-
ally significant matters. The House 
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill 
explained:
The problem is whether the time 
and attention and energy of the 
court shall be devoted to matters 
of large public concern, or whether 
they shall be consumed by matters 
of less concern, without especial 
general interest, and only because 
the litigant wants to have the court 
of last resort pass upon his right.
In a 1925 Yale Law Review article, 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
provided more detail about what 
sorts of cases he believed the Court 
should take on certiorari after pas-
sage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating 
the criteria the Court first articulat-
ed in the 1890s—and that today are 
embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme 
Court is conceived to be . . . the 
consideration of cases whose deci-
sion involves principles, the appli-
cation of which are of wide pub-
lic or governmental interest, and 
which should be authoritatively 
declared by the final court. Such 
cases should include issues of the 
Federal constitutional validity of 
statutes, Federal and State, genuine 
issues of constitutional rights of 
individuals, the interpretation of 
Federal statutes when it will affect 
large classes of people, questions 
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of gen-
eral law of such wide application 
that the Supreme Court may help 
remove the doubt. Where there 
is a conflict of opinion between 
intermediate appellate courts in 
the different Circuits or between 
the Federal intermediate appellate 
courts and the Supreme Courts of 
the States, the public interest cer-
tainly requires that the Supreme 
Court hear the cases, if its decision 
will remove the conflict.
The Judges’ Bill did not com-
pletely eliminate caseload pressures, 
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone 
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s. 
In October Term 2011, the Court con-
sidered more than 7,500 petitions, 
although this number represents a 
modest decrease from prior years. 
Despite these massive numbers, 
however, the Court has not fallen 
behind in dealing with these filings. 
Instead, it has adopted a variety 
of ways of dealing with them effi-
ciently—from eliminating the need 
to discuss a petition in the justices’ 
conference unless at least one justice 
wants to consider it, to relying on 
law clerks to read the petitions and 
summarize them in brief memos. 
This latter mechanism relies heavi-
ly on the “cert pool”—a cooperative 
agreement among most of the jus-
tices (currently, all but Justice Alito) 
in which the petitions are divided 
among the chambers and each petition 
is assigned to a single law clerk. The 
cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits, 
however, the Court continued to 
feel greatly burdened by its work-
load in the mid- to late twentieth 
century, even as the number of merits 
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court 
heard argument and issued written 
opinions in approximately 150 cases 
a year. Many observers, and some of 
the justices themselves, believed that 
150 cases were simply too many for 
the Court to handle well. Moreover, 
these people argued, the Court was 
unable to give truly important cases 
the time and attention they needed 
in part because of the need to man-
age the mandatory appeals, which 
were often not of interest beyond the 
parties themselves. There was much 
discussion of some kind of national 
court of appeals or other panel to 
assist the Supreme Court with the 
more mundane cases. Then-Justice 
William H. Rehnquist explained at 
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be 
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be per-
suaded, not ultimately but very 
presently, there ought to be a 
new national court, frankly 
recognized as such, with judges 
appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, who 
would act as something of a junior 
chamber of the Supreme Court, 
to hear primarily statutory cases 
about which there are presently 
conflicts in the circuit[s].
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As we all know, no such dramatic change occurred. During the 
1970s, Congress eliminated man-
datory jurisdiction in a number 
of types of cases and in 1988, once 
again at the justices’ urging, it elim-
inated almost all of the remaining 
direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 
The Court, freed from mandatory 
appeals and aggressively applying its 
certiorari criteria, has been hearing 
argument in fewer and fewer cases 
a year. In October Term 2011, for 
example, the number of cases decid-
ed after briefing and oral argument 
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place 
the Supreme Court caseload at his-
toric lows, but, as Judge Richard A. 
Posner has pointed out, when mea-
sured as a proportion of all cases in 
the federal judicial system, the case-
load is vanishingly small. He “com-
pare[s] the percentage just of fed-
eral court cases in which the Court 
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11% 
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the 
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find 
that “the Court reviewed, in relative 
terms, almost 15 times as many fed-
eral court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter 
and Landis said in 1928 remains just 
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the 
history of the Supreme Court 
is its progressive contraction of 
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with 
the vast expansion of the bounds 
of the inferior federal courts, the 
scope of review by the Supreme 
Court has been steadily narrowed.
Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.
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This “progressive contraction,” 
both of mandatory jurisdiction and 
of the Court’s exercise of its own dis-
cretion to hear cases, has reached a 
point where the concerns expressed 
today about the Supreme Court’s 
workload are unprecedented. Com-
mentators and observers today com-
plain that the Court is not taking 
enough cases and that the justices 
do not work hard enough. In stark 
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
statements at his confirmation hear-
ings, then-Judge John G. Roberts in-
dicated at his hearings in 2005 that 
he thought there was “room for the 
Court to take more cases.” None-
theless, since his confirmation, the 
Court has not in fact done so. As al-
ready noted, the Court decided only 
65 cases after briefing and argument 
in October Term 2011. Whether 
and how Congress—or the Court it-
self—will ultimately respond to such 
complaints and observations, and 
what the next 125 years will bring, 
remains to be seen. ◆
